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Abstract. We argue for the usefulness of abductive reasoning in the
context of ontologies. We discuss several applicaton scenarios in which
various forms of abduction would be useful, introduce corresponding ab-
ductive reasoning tasks, and give examples. Moreover, we briefly sum-
marise the work that has been done in the area of abductive reasoning
outside classical propositional logic, and begin to develop the formal ap-
paratus needed to employ abductive inference in expressive description
logics.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Although the Description Logic and Non-Monotonic Logic communities are still
vastly disjoint, there is a growing consensus in the DL and Semantic Web com-
munities that many interesting application areas emerging from the usage of
DLs as ontology languages will also require, in addition to the mostly deductive
and monotonic reasoning techniques of current systems and the development of
ever more expressive DLs such as the DL SROIQ (10) underlying OWL 1.1,
the adoption of various forms of non-classical reasoning techniques (? ).
For instance, recent work trying to integrate DLs with non-classical rea-
soning includes non-monotonic reasoning for DLs based on circumscription (4),
knowledge integration for DL using techniques from propositional inconsistency
management with belief update (18), non-standard inferences in DL to the least
common subsumer (lcs) and the most specific concept (mcs) in (? ).
Common sense reasoning can be classified into three modes of inference,
deduction, induction, and abduction, going back to Charles Sanders Peirce, cf.
(20; 21). Unlike deduction, abduction and induction are ampliative, meaning that
they provide more ‘knowledge’ than can be obtained deductively from a given
knowledge base. However neither induction nor abduction are truth preserving,
meaning that if the premises of the inference are true.
Formally, abduction can be expressed as
B
A→ B
A
2i.e., from the observation that B holds, and the fact that A ‘implies’ B (A ‘is a
reason for B’/‘is a cause for B’ etc.), infer A. Within classical logic, this is a non
sequitur inference, called affirming the consequent. Thus we have to constrain
this reasoning in some ways and cannot just add this rule to a deductive calculus.
There are different constraints for abduction, the most common go by the
following names, where Γ is some knowledge base, and A,B are formulae, cf. (2):
1. Consistency: Γ +A 6|= ⊥;
2. Minimality: A is a ‘minimal explanation’ for B;
3. Relevance: A 6|= B;
4. Explanatoriness: Γ 6|= B, A 6|= B.
These criteria can be taken in a pick and choose fashion. For example, we might
want consistent and minimal abduction, but leave the case where B is added
as its own explanation as a limiting case, and thus forsake both, relevance and
explanatoriness. The most fundamental constraint of the above list is consis-
tency. There is basically no definition of abduction in the literature that does
not have the requirement of consistency, unless the inference is left completely
unconstraint as Γ + A |= B, often referred to as plain abduction. The reason
for this requirement is clear: if our logical language is based on classical logic,
the addition of A to a set Γ could lead to trivialisation on it being inconsistent,
thus leading to every formula inconsistent with Γ being an explanation for every
formula of the language. In the following we will define abduction only using the
criterion of consistency.
The relevance of forms of abductive reasoning in the context of the World
Wide Web was noted early on, before the idea of a Semantic Web in the current
sense was even envisioned. Shank and Cunningham write in 1996 (22):
There is an embarrassing lack of research on learning from the World Wide
Web. [. . . ] The learner is an information seeker, not the end point of a com-
municative act. As we move into the information age and are inundated by
increasing volumes of information, the need for reasoning skills – rather than
mastery of a subject matter – is ever more evident. [. . . ]
Traditional models of inductive and deductive inference are simply inade-
quate in conceptualizing the skills necessary to utilize the WWW. On the web
we are seeking omens and clues, diagnosing symptoms and scenarios, etc. In
other words, the inferential basis of learning from the web is largely abductive
(although induction and deduction may also come to the fore at various points
in the information exploration process).
Curiously, however, while abductive reasoning techniques have been intensively
studied in the context of classical, mostly propositional logic, we are aware only
of very little work on abductive reasoning that addresses non-classical logics in
general, and description logics in particular, although, as we argue, the potential
applications are legion. DLs are especially interesting for abduction as they allow
abduction to be raised to the first order level within a decidable fragment.
In this paper, we try to briefly summarise the relevant work that has been
done in the area of abductive reasoning, outline the potential use-cases for ab-
3duction in the context of ontologies by discussing several abductive reasoning
tasks and examples, and begin to develop the formal apparatus needed to employ
abductive inference in expressive description logics.
2 Preliminaries
Since we intend to capture general abductive reasoning tasks, we will usually
not specify the logic we are dealing with, but just refer to it generically as L.
Furthermore, since the concept language etc. is not fixed, we will avoid terms
such as general concept inclusion (GCI) and will not specify the syntactic form
of Abox assertions. Instead, we will rather use the neutral terms Tbox and Abox
assertion. Moreover, we will identify a logic L with its language, i.e., with its set
of concept, role, and individual names, and its set of concept constructors, e.g.,
conjunction, existential restrictions, etc. Also, we will distinguish between the
source logic L of an abduction problem, and the target logic L′ in which we
seek for solutions.
Given a set of assertions ∆, we shall denote by L(∆) the set of logical and
non-logical symbols used in ∆.
Given a logic L, by |= we always mean the global consequence relation of L.
Furthermore, the notions of consistency of a knowledge base, satisfiability of a
concept, etc., are standard.
– some stuff about DLs.
– Distinguish source and target language L and L′.
3 Abductive Reasoning Tasks in DL
3.1 Concept Abduction
Definition 1 (Simple Concept Abduction). Let L be a DL, C a concept
in L, Γ a knowledge base in L, and suppose that C is satisfiable w.r.t. Γ . A
solution to the simple concept abduction problem for 〈Γ,C〉 is any concept
H in L′ such that
Γ |= H v C.
The set of all such solutions is denoted by SSCA(Γ,C).
Note that if this problem is restricted to concept names, it is just the problem
of building the class tree and picking the concept names being subsumed by a
given concept C, a task readily accomplished by current DL implementations
even for very expressive description logics. However, we might be interested in
finding concepts that are subsumed by a complex concept C.
Example 1. Assume Γ is an ontology about geography in Europe comprising
concepts country, nominals France etc. for specific countries, a role isMemberOf ,
and so on. Now, given the concept country u ∃isMemberOf .SchengenTreaty, the
4most specific non-trivial solutions to the simple concept abduction problem are
each of the concepts France, Germany, etc., i.e., the countries that happen to be
members of the Schengen Treaty. not a great exam-
ple, want an example
with non-atomic so-
lutions...
A variant of plain concept abduction, that we call here conditionalised concept
abduction, is motivated by the matchmaking problem discussed below, and is
defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Conditionalised Concept Abduction). Let L be a DL, C
and D concepts in L, Γ a knowledge base in L, and suppose that C,D are
satisfiable concepts w.r.t. Γ . A solution to the concept abduction problem for
〈Γ,C,D〉 is any concept H in L′ such that
Γ 6|= C uH ≡ ⊥ and Γ |= C uH v D.
The set of all such solutions is denoted by SCCA(Γ,C,D).
Conditionalised concept abduction is a limiting case of simple concept abduction
with C = > and the solutions H consistent with Γ . Put another way, condition-
alised concept abduction seeks (consistent) solutions to a SCA-problem of a
specific syntactic form, namely conjunctions C uH, where C is fixed in advance.
CCA was first introduced in (6; 7; 5), where it is simply called concept ab-
duction, and where it is motivated by the mathchmaking problem.
The authors do propose a tableaux algorithm to compute solutions to the
conditionalised concept abduction problem, and discuss various minimality prin-
ciples. However, they only consider the rather inexpressive DL ALN (which al-
lows only atomic negation and no disjunctions or existential restrictions), and it
is not clear how far their techniques extend to more expressive DLs.unclear...
Another area where the use of concept abduction/contraction has been dis-
cussed is the problem of querying for similar workflow fragments (9), where
fragments that are largely relevant to a user may happen to fall outside a strict
subsumption relationship. There, a mechanism is needed to measure the (dis-)
similarity between workflow fragments, e.g., by calculating how many services
are to be moved, removed, added, replaced, merged or split in order to relate
different fragments.
Discuss limitations of concept abduction and contraction and the solutions
and algorithms presented in (6) and (7).
3.2 Abox Abduction
Definition 3 (Abox Abduction). Let L be a DL, Γ a knowledge base in L,
and φ(a¯) an Abox assertion in L such that Γ ∪ φ(a¯) is consistent. A solution to
the Abox abduction problem for 〈Γ, a¯, φ〉 is any finite set SA = {ψi(bi) | i ≤ n}
of Abox assertions of L′ such that
Γ ∪ SA |= φ(a¯).
If SA contains only assertions of the form ψ(b¯) with b¯ ⊆ a¯, it is called a solip-
sistic solution. The set of all solutions is denoted by SA(Γ, a¯, φ), and the set of
all solipsistic solutions by SAS(Γ, a¯, φ).
5Example 2 (Medical Diagnosis). Consider the problem of diagnosis in medical
ontologies. Suppose there is a strange disease, called the Shake-Hands-Disease
(SHD), that always develops when you shake hands with someone who carries
the Shake-Hands-Disease-Virus (SHDV).
Suppose your medical ontology Γ contains roles has symptom, carries virus,
has disease, etc., concepts SHD, SHDV Lazyness, Pizza Appetite, Google Lover,
etc., and individual names Peter, Paul, Mary, etc. Further, assume your Tbox
contains axioms
∃has disease.SHD v ∃has symptom.(Lazyness u Pizza Appetite)
Researcher v ∃has symptom.(Lazyness u Pizza Appetite u Google Lover)
∃shake hands.∃carries virus.SHDV v ∃has disease.SHD.
and your Abox contains
Mary : ∃carries virus.SHDV.
Now, suppose you observe the fact that
(†) Paul : ∃has symptom.(Lazyness u Pizza Appetite).
Then a solipsistic solution to the Abox abduction problem given by (†) is the
set
{Paul : Researcher}.
However, a non-solipsistic solution is also given by
{〈Paul,Mary〉 : shake hands},
which would suggest that Paul has the Shake-Hands-Disease.
Thus, Abox abduction can be understood as a new query answering service,
retrieving abductively instances of concepts (or roles) that would entail a desired
Abox assertion.
3.3 Tbox Abduction
Definition 4 (Tbox Abduction). Let L be a DL, Γ a knowledge base in L,
and C, D concepts that are satisfiable w.r.t. Γ and such that Γ 6|= C v D, but
Γ ∪ {C v D} is consistent. A solution to the Tbox abduction problem for
〈Γ,C,D〉 is any finite set ST = {Gi v Hi | i ≤ n} of Tbox assertions in L′ such
that
Γ ∪ ST |= C v D.
The set of all such solutions is denoted by ST(Γ,C,D).
move this to the end,
together with ser-
vices etc.: need other
example
6Example 3 (Debugging: explaining desired subsumptions). In (11), it is shown
how to debug and repair unsatisfiable concepts C, respectively, unwanted sub-
sumptions C v D. By using Reiter’s hitting set tree algorithm to compute all
the minimal unsatisfiability preserving sub-TBoxes (MUPS) of an unsatisfiable
concept, various repair plans are suggested that remove certain GCIs from a
knowledge base Γ resulting in a knowledge base Γ ′ such that Γ ′ 6|= C v D.
Tbox abduction provides a solution to the dual problem, i.e, to propose a re-
pair plan for the case where a subsumption C v D is expected by an ontology
engineer, but does not follow from Γ as developed so far: every (explanatory)
solution S to the Tbox abduction problem 〈Γ,C,D〉 provides a finite set of Tbox
assertions such that, when added to Γ to obtain Γ ′, Γ ′ |= C v D.
These last two abductive reasoning tasks can be easily generalised to general
knowledge base abduction:
3.4 Knowledge Base Abduction
Definition 5 (Knowledge Base Abduction). Let L be a DL, Γ a knowledge
base in L, and φ an Abox or Tbox assertion such that Γ ∪ {φ} is consistent. A
solution to the knowledge base abduction problem for 〈Γ, φ〉 is any finite set
S = {φi | i ≤ n} of Tbox and Abox assertions such that
Γ ∪ S |= φ.
The set of all such solutions is denoted by SK(φ).
Obviously, if φ is an Abox assertion, any solution to the Abox abduction
problem is also a solution to the knowledge base abduction problem, and similary
if φ is a Tbox assertion, i.e., the following inclusions hold:
SA(φ) ⊆ SK(φ) and ST(φ) ⊆ SK(φ).
Moreover, depending on the logic under consideration, we can sometimes rewrite
solutions to an Abox abduction problem into solutions to an equivalent Tbox
abduction problem, and conversely. For instance, suppose we work in the logic
ALCO, comprising nominals. Then an Abox assertion a : C can be equivalently
rewritten as the Tbox assertion {a} v C. Conversely,
Remark 1. Related to ‘explanatory induction’? (? )
Example 4. Want an example where neither Abox nor Tbox abduction would
do, or were it would be ‘unnatural’...
We now address the two main problem areas associated with abductive rea-
soning, namely the selection of ‘good’ solutions, and the algorithmic problem of
finding solutions. We begin with the selection problem.
74 Selecting Explanations
Clearly, the definitions given so far are very general in that they even allow for in-
consistent and trivial explanations, and do not make any explicit restrictions on
the syntactic form of solutions. These are in fact the most common restrictions
on solutions, i.e., restrictions concerning the deductive properties of solutions,
and restrictions concerning the syntactic form of solutions. Apart from the def-
inition of creative solutions, the following is a standard classification often used
in connection with solutions to abductive problems (19; 2):
Definition 6 (Plain, Consistent, Relevant, and Explanatory). Let L be
a DL, Γ a knowledge base in L, P(φ) an abductive problem, and S(P(φ)) the set
of its solutions in language L′. We call solutions:
1. S(P(φ)) plain solutions to P
2. SCon(P(φ)) := {S ∈ S(P(φ)) | S ∪ Γ 6|= ⊥} consistent solutions
3. SRel(P(φ)) := {S ∈ S(P(φ)) | S 6|= φ} relevant solutions
4. SExp(P(φ)) := {S ∈ SRel(P(φ)) | Γ 6|= φ}} explanatory solutions
5. SCre(P(φ)) := {S ∈ S(P(φ)) | L(S) 6⊆ L(Γ, φ)}} creative solutions
Because of the consistency requirement, abduction in the literature is often
seen as a special form of belief expansion (used here as a technical term in line
with the AGM framework of belief change (1)). This means that a set S(P(φ))
of explanations for φ is found and an element ψ ∈ S(P(φ)) is selected and then
added to the knowledge base. If, however, no consistent explanation is found,
either φ itself is added (expansion as the limiting case) or the abduction is
declined (failure as the limiting case).
Clearly, this is a restrictive view of abduction. Firstly, consistent abduction
cannot challenge our background theory Γ as it never triggers a revision (12).
This, however, is often desirable, for instance in the case where a solution S for
〈Γ, φ〉 is inconsistent but explanatory, and where it is considered important to
have φ as a consequence of the knowledge base. In such a case, we want to revise
Γ such that φ becomes a consequence of it, S is kept, and Γ is modified to Γ ′ such
that Γ ′ ∪ {S} is consistent. Such a revision can be performed, for instance, by
using the techniques of (11). Secondly, our KB Γ might be inconsistent from the
outset. At this point, we might not want an abduction problem S(P(φ)) to trigger
a revision of Γ because, depending on the way revisions for Γ are performed, this
might yield an updated Γ ′ whose modification has nothing to do with S(P(φ)),
in which case we might prefer to perform paraconsistent abductive reasoning, as
proposed in (8). Hence, although we can see applications of abduction challenging
Γ and abduction not being restricted to the lucky, consistent cases, we think that
it is dangerous to treat abductively inferred beliefs equal to knowledge. After
all, explanations are hypothetical and abductive inference can be superseded by
new information.
Relevant and explanatory solutions impose further conditions on the deduc-
tive properties of solutions. If a solution S is relevant for P(φ), φ is not already
a logical consequence of S. If S is additionally explanatory, it is guaranteed that
8φ does not already follow from Γ , but is only a consequence of Γ together with
S.
Another interesting class of solutions are the creative ones—these are ex-
planations that provide a proper extension to the vocabulary of the knowledge
base, and thus add a genuinely new part to the ontology in order to explain,
for example, a given subsumption. Obviously, such extensions are difficult to ob-
tain automatically, but could be obtained semi-automatically via an interactive
ontology revision and refinement process using abductive reasoning.
Next, let us look at syntactic restrictions:
4.1 Common Selection Techniques and Heuristics
1. restriction on signature
2. minimality, various notions
3. non-triviality
Minimality Abduction is also closely related to various so-called ‘non-standard
reasoning tasks’ that have been discussed in the DL literature so far in that it
shares requirement such as minimality conditions, and practical considerations
where ‘good’ solutions might give up perfect minimality. For instance, the prob-
lem of finding the least common subsumer (lcs) D for a finite list C1, . . . , Cn
of concepts (3) w.r.t. to a Tbox Γ , i.e., such that Γ |= Ci @ D for all i, and if E
is a concept with this property, then Γ |= D @ E.
Finding the lcs is trivial in logics that allow disjunction. On the other hand,
it does not necessarily exist, for instance in logics allowing transitive roles (3).
A similar problem appears for the plain concept abduction problem: here,
we are given a concept C, and want to a abduce those concepts D such that
Γ |= D v C, and, typically, such that D is v-minimal, i.e., such that for all
concepts E: Γ |= E v C and Γ |= E v D implies Γ |= D v E. Note, however,
that in contrast to the problem of finding the lcs, this problem is not trivialised
if disjuntions are allowed to be used in solutions D.
Example 5. Give example (involving transitivity) where no v-minimal solution
exist. Compare to first-order.
However, just as in the case of abduction for modal logics (17), this problem
disappears whenever the finite model property (FMP) obtains:
Conjecture 1. Suppose that L is a DL with the FMP. Then any Tbox abduction
problem 〈Γ,C,D〉 has a v-minimal solution.
4.2 Heuristics motivated by Ontology Reasoning
In the context of reasoning with ontologies, a number of further restrictions on
what constitutes a ‘good solution’ to an abduction problem can be identified.
For instance, we might want our solutions to be ‘conservative’ in the following
sense:
91. conditions that ensure a certain ‘stability’ of the class tree, e.g., our ontol-
ogy might comprise a ‘foundational’ part, and a domain ontology, and we
might want to require that the foundational part of the class tree remains
unchanged.
2. conditions that leave entailments of a part of the signature untouched. (same
as the last entry???)
3. conditions that leave Abox entailments untouched?
5 Summary and Outlook
Any connection to Ontology integration, selective information sharing, or some
such?
Summary of technical challenges ahead etc....
To do list:
– Conceptual work: identify most interesting abductive reasoning tasks, (se-
mantic) notions of minimality, appropriate syntactic restrictions of solutions,
etc.
– Devise algorithmic solutions and determine their complexity
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